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On 29 November 2009, 58 % of Swiss voters (with a turnout of 54 %) approved a popular 
initiative for a constitutional ban on the construction of minarets.
1
 The outcome of the vote 
attracted attention from all over the world and was widely condemned, not least by the UN 
Human Rights Council and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, as a 
discriminatory measure in violation of the right to freedom of religion.
2
 Almost exactly a 
year later, on 28 November 2010, a 53 % majority of voters backed a proposal for a new 
constitutional provision requiring the automatic expulsion of foreign nationals convicted of 
certain criminal offences specified by law, including benefit fraud.
3
 Prior to the vote, the 
Federal Council (the federal government) had warned that the new provision would be 
incompatible with a number of human rights, in particular the right to private and family 
life, guaranteed by the Swiss Federal Constitution as well as international treaties ratified by 
Switzerland such as the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), and the Convention on 
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These two popular initiatives were only the latest in a series of proposals that conflict with 
human rights guarantees. In 2004, Swiss voters passed an initiative requiring the lifelong 
detention of dangerous sexual and violent offenders, a requirement that is, to put it mildly, 
difficult to reconcile with the right to regular judicial review guaranteed by Article 5(4) of 
the ECHR.
5
 In 2008, in contrast, a majority of voters rejected a proposed constitutional 
amendment that would have allowed for naturalisation decisions to be taken by popular 
vote.
6
 The amendment would have amounted to a violation of procedural guarantees of the 
Federal Constitution and the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 13 of the 
ECHR, Article 2(3) of the ICCPR, and Article 6 of the International Convention on the 




These recent popular initiatives have triggered a major debate in Switzerland as to the 
appropriate relationship between direct democracy and human rights. Simply stated, this 
debate opposes, on the one hand, those who depict the people as the absolute sovereign on 
whose will, finding its expression in direct democratic processes, no limits can be imposed 
with, on the other hand, those who argue that in a state based on the rule of law, even the 
people must comply with certain fundamental rules, including respect for human rights, and 
that courts can review expressions of the popular will for compliance with these rules. The 
debate is not only being fought out in legal scholarship but has also led to a wide range of 
concrete policy proposals from a variety of actors. The purpose of this article is twofold. 
First, to discuss the current legal framework regulating the relationship between direct 
democratic instruments (especially the popular initiative) and human rights, and, second, to 
present and assess the most important proposals for reforming that framework. 
 
 
1 The Swiss system of (semi-)direct democracy 
The political system of Switzerland is often described as a ‘semi-direct democracy’ as it 
combines elements of representative democracy (in the form of an elected parliament 
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authorised to pass legislation) with direct democratic mechanisms.
8
 Since all major political 
parties are represented on the Federal Council, such mechanisms allowing the people to 
directly participate in political processes provide an essential corrective to the lack of a 
strong opposition. The direct democratic mechanisms existing at the federal level include 
the mandatory referendum, the optional referendum, and the popular initiative. 
 
Amendments to the Federal Constitution as well as accession to organisations for collective 
security and supranational organisations are subject to a mandatory referendum.
9
 They need 
to be approved by both the majority of those voting and the majority of cantons,
10
 the vote 
of the latter being determined by the result of the popular vote in the respective canton.
11
 
Federal acts passed by the Federal Assembly (the federal parliament) and parliamentary 
approval of important international treaties are subject to an optional referendum, meaning 
that either 50,000 persons eligible to vote or eight cantons may ask for them to be put to a 
vote.
12





Most importantly for the present context, the popular initiative gives 100,000 persons 
eligible to vote the right to propose a complete or partial revision of the Federal 
Constitution.
14
 The right to propose a partial revision of the constitution was not introduced 
until 1891, more than 40 years after the creation of modern Switzerland as a federal state in 
1848. The number of signatories required to launch a popular initiative was only raised 
once, from 50,000 to 100,000 in 1977, not least as a reaction to the introduction of women’s 
suffrage in 1971.
15
 Today, that number equals slightly less than 2 % of the over 5 million 
citizens who are eligible to vote (out of a total population of 7.8 million). Despite this low 
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percentage requirement, after a marked increase of popular initiatives in the 1970s, the 
frequency with which this instrument is used has been relatively stable. On average, four 




Any measure that can be formulated as a constitutional norm may be proposed by way of a 
popular initiative. This may include proposals that would entail radical changes to the 
political system of Switzerland, such as abolition of the armed forces
17
 or accession to the 
European Union.
18
 Thus, ‘the popular initiative enlarges the realm of the politically 
thinkable and feasible.’19 Apart from the very limited reasons for declaring popular 
initiatives invalid discussed in Section 3 below, they must be put to the vote in their original 
wording. The only way in which the Federal Assembly can react to an initiative is to issue a 
recommendation to voters on how to vote and, if it deems appropriate, to draft a counter-
proposal.
20
 Popular initiatives need to be approved by the double majority of voters and 
cantons.
21
 Only 18 out of the 175 initiatives voted on so far have managed to pass this 
hurdle.
22
 Nevertheless, even if not approved, a popular initiative may have a significant 
indirect impact, putting issues on the political agenda or triggering legislative changes.  
 
 
2 Direct democracy and the human rights of minorities 
Decision-making in parliament is characterised by mechanisms of deliberation (such as 
commission meetings and expert hearings), bargaining processes promoting compromise, 
and further safeguards (such as public voting) that tend to protect the interests of minorities. 
Since these mediating mechanisms and safeguards are absent in popular votes, it is often 
assumed that minorities fare worse in a system of direct democracy as compared to that of a 
representative democracy. That direct democracy may lend itself to tyranny of the majority 
was, of course, already present in the minds of the founding fathers of the United States. 
James Madison maintained that with direct participation of citizens in government decision-
making, ‘measures are too often decided, not according to the rule of justice and the rights 
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of the minor party but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority’23 and 
that, therefore, ‘[i]t is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against 
the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the 
other part.’24 
 
Empirical work testing that assumption is surprisingly sparse and limited to Switzerland and 
the US states, those parts of the world where by far the largest share of popular votes takes 
place. In what was probably the first systematic analysis, in 1997, Barbara Gamble looked at 
US state and local votes on initiatives and referenda concerning civil rights legislation and 
found that the interests of minority groups were on the losing side in 78 % of cases.
25
 
Another study conducted in California concluded that, in general, ‘there is little overall anti-
minority bias in the system of direct democracy’, but that when proposals explicitly targeted 
racial and ethnic minorities, these minorities – and Latinos in particular – lost regularly.26 In 
contrast, in the first – and for a long time only – empirical Swiss study, Bruno Frey and 
Lorenz Goette analysed a number of federal, cantonal, and municipal votes and found that 




Measuring the effects of direct democracy on the rights of minorities is a complex task, so 
that the results of these and similar early studies need to be approached with caution. First, 
none of these studies are really comprehensive but instead rely on very limited samples that 
are not always properly explained. Second, they do not account for the fact that not all 
popular votes are equally important to the minority groups concerned. Third, they generally 
do not attempt to distinguish between different minorities according to their political 
leverage, degree of social integration, and so on. Fourth, they often fail to provide an 
adequate comparison of their results to what would be the outcome in a system of 
representative democracy. This led John Matsusaka to conclude in 2005 that 
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‘[u]nfortunately, there is little rigorous empirical work on this issue, and the work that does 
exist rests on flawed methodologies.’28 
 
Since then, however, a US study that replicates and extends previous research and directly 
compares outcomes of direct democratic processes to those in representative democracy has 
confirmed that, at least as far as the rights of homosexuals are concerned, this particular 
minority is in fact more likely to lose in direct democratic contests.
29
 Most importantly for 
our purposes, in 2010, Adrian Vatter and Deniz Danaci undertook a comprehensive analysis 
of all 193 popular votes affecting the interests of minorities that took place in Switzerland at 
the federal and cantonal levels from 1960 to 2007. They found that, as a general tendency, 
minorities fare worse in popular votes as compared to those in representative institutions.
30
 
However, there are very important differences between the various minority groups. For 
example, the interests of homosexuals and disabled people are equally well protected in 
direct democratic processes as in parliament. Other groups, such as linguistic minorities, 
fare only slightly worse in direct democracy. Finally, popular votes have a significant 
negative impact for religious minorities (especially non-Christian communities)
31
 and, in 
particular, foreign nationals – all recent referenda intended to prevent the tightening of 
immigration laws, for example, have failed. Thus, the authors conclude, it is especially one 
particular type of minority group that loses out in direct democratic processes, namely those 





This finding is certainly confirmed by the experience made with the direct democratic 
instrument that is the focus of this article: the popular initiative at the federal level. Already 
the first popular initiative ever submitted was aimed at restricting the freedom of religion of 
an ‘outgroup’, the Jews. In 1893, the majority of voters accepted a new constitutional 
provision prohibiting kosher butchering.
33
 Although there were several further initiatives 
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targeting unpopular minorities in the twentieth century, most importantly a series of 
proposals to restrict immigration in the 1970s, all were rejected. However, in more recent 
years, initiatives aimed at restricting the human rights of unpopular groups have again been 
attracting majority support. As explained above, since 2004 there have been votes on (at 
least) four such initiatives, three of which were passed. The lifelong detention initiative 
targeted a group that is particularly stigmatised by society: sexual and violent offenders. The 
minarets initiative restricted the freedom of religion of the Muslim community, an 
archetypical ‘outgroup’ in Switzerland – not only are Muslims members of a non-Christian 
religious minority but also are 88 % of them foreign nationals.
34
 Finally, the expulsion 
initiative was directed against those described as ‘the worst of the worst’: those who lack 
Swiss citizenship and, in addition, have allegedly demonstrated their inability to integrate 
into society by committing a crime. 
 
While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons for this recent trend, two factors seem to 
have played an important role. First, over the last two decades, the right-wing Swiss 
People’s Party, which supported all four popular initiatives referred to above, has 
transformed itself into the best-organised (and best-funded) Swiss political party and has, 
accordingly, considerably grown in strength, becoming the strongest party in 2003.
35
 
Second, political parties – the Swiss People’s Party foremost among them – have 
increasingly started to use the popular initiative as a campaigning instrument to attract the 
attention of the media and the public, especially in view of upcoming elections.
36
 Proposals 
that challenge established rule-of-law principles and target the rights of unpopular minority 
groups, thus giving voters the opportunity to give expression to their discontent with the 
established system and vague fears, may be a particularly promising instrument for such 
symbolic politics. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the majority of those who 
approved the minarets ban indicated in post-vote surveys that their vote should be 
understood as ‘a symbolic sign’.37 
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The recent rise of popular initiatives that violate the rights of minority groups raises the 
question as to whether there are, or should be, any limitations on direct democratic 
instruments. Are there any limits to the will of the people? 
 
 
3 Current limitations on popular initiatives 
Under current law, a popular initiative must only meet minimal requirements to be put to the 
vote. Prior to the start of the collection of signatures, the signature sheets must be reviewed 
by the Federal Chancellery to ensure that they contain certain basic information.
38
 Once the 
required 100,000 signatures have been collected and submitted (which must occur within 18 
months),
39
 the Federal Assembly, based on a report of the Federal Council, reviews the 
initiative for its compliance with the following three elements listed in Article 139(3) of the 
Federal Constitution. First, the initiative must take the form of either a general proposal or a 
specific draft, but not a hybrid between the two. Second, it must observe the single-subject 
rule. Third, it must not conflict with peremptory norms of international law. A fourth, 





The central requirement for the present context is the third one. While some authors argue 
that ‘peremptory norms of international law’ is a reference to the corpus of law that is 
internationally recognised as constituting ius cogens,
41
 others think that it is an autonomous 
term of Swiss constitutional law that can be interpreted more broadly to also include 
fundamental norms of international law that have not (yet) attained ius cogens status.
42
 The 
Federal Assembly and the Federal Council have adopted a narrow definition of the term, 
limiting it to those rules that are of such fundamental importance to the international 
community that they must be regarded as binding upon any state that respects the rule of 
law and that can thus never be derogated from.
43
 These rules are said to include the 
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prohibitions of genocide, slavery, and torture, the principle of non-refoulement, the core 
guarantees of international humanitarian law, and the non-derogable guarantees of the 
ECHR and the ICCPR.
44
 Since international responsibility for violation of this body of 
international law simply cannot be evaded, it makes good sense that norms of domestic law 
that are incompatible with it should never come into force, regardless of their democratic 
legitimacy. Given its narrow definition, however, this validity requirement does not present 
a major obstacle. Only one popular initiative has ever been declared invalid for violating a 
peremptory norm of international law. In 1996, the Federal Assembly adjudged an initiative 
demanding the immediate expulsion of all asylum-seekers who have entered the country 
illegally to be incompatible with the principle of non-refoulement.
45
 Neither in the case of 
the minarets initiative nor in that of the expulsion initiative did the federal authorities think 
that there was a violation of peremptory norms of international law, arguing in the former 
case that the freedom to exercise one’s religion and the prohibition of discrimination do not 
form part of ius cogens,
46
 and in the latter that the proposal can be implemented in a way 
that respects the principle of non-refoulement.
47
 In fact, all sorts of proposals that clearly 
violate human rights would be compatible with this requirement, from a ban on smiling in 
public to denying red-haired people access to public education.  
 
If one of the four requirements mentioned above is not satisfied, the Federal Assembly 
declares the popular initiative invalid. Otherwise, it must put it to the vote of the people and 
the cantons. The decision of the Assembly cannot be challenged before the courts (or any 
other body). 
 
If the initiative is approved by a majority of voters and cantons, the proposed constitutional 
norm enters into force.
48
 In case of the sort of initiatives at issue here, this leads to a conflict 
between the new constitutional norm and, first, other norms of constitutional law (namely 
those guaranteeing fundamental rights) and, second, international human rights treaties, 
most importantly the ECHR. As far as the first conflict is concerned, the Swiss Federal 
Constitution does not provide for a hierarchy between its different norms as, for example, 
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the German Basic Law does.
49
 Therefore, it is relatively uncontentious that, in accordance 
with the general rules of interpretation, the newer and more specific norm (for example the 
minarets ban) prevails over the older and more general guarantees of fundamental rights (for 
example the guarantees of freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination).
50
 The 
second conflict, however, inevitably leads to a dilemma: either Switzerland violates its 
obligations under international human rights law or a constitutional norm approved in a 
democratic process is not given effect.  
 
Where, as is often the case, constitutional norms are implemented through enactment of 
legislation, Parliament will typically try to solve the dilemma by coming up with legislative 
measures that address the main concerns behind the popular initiative but are still within the 
confines of international law. The result may then be a compromise solution that is based on 
a very broad interpretation of the wording of the new constitutional norm and may not fully 
reflect the intention of the authors of the initiative. This was how the initiative for the 
lifelong detention of sexual and violent offenders was eventually dealt with.
51
 In the case of 
the recent initiative for the expulsion of foreign criminals, a commission was established 
which is currently trying to draw up implementing measures that would reflect the different 




Where, as with the minarets ban, the constitutional norm is specific enough to be directly 
applicable, courts or other public authorities that are supposed to apply the norm may be 
confronted with the same dilemma. For example, if a planning application for a minaret was 
submitted, the new Article 72(3) of the Federal Constitution (providing that ‘the 
construction of minarets is prohibited’) would require them to reject it, whereas Article 9 of 
the ECHR (the guarantee of the freedom of religion) would seem to oblige them to grant it. 
Courts confronted with such a dilemma will first of all attempt to interpret the constitutional 
norm in a manner that is compatible with international law. In that regard, Swiss courts are 
in a comparable position to UK courts, which are obliged under section 3 of the Human 
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Rights Act to interpret domestic law in a way which is compatible with the ECHR in so far 
as it is possible to do so.  
 
In some cases, however, including most probably that of the minarets ban, an interpretation 
in conformity with international law is simply impossible. The Swiss Federal Constitution 
does not contain any explicit rules as to how the conflict is then to be solved, that is, 
whether the constitutional norm or international law prevails. Although Article 5(4) 
provides that ‘the Confederation … shall respect international law’, it does not explain what 
body of law prevails in case of conflict.
53
 Similarly, Article 190 obliges courts to apply 
international law (as well as federal acts) but does not establish a hierarchical relationship 
between the different categories of norms. The Federal Court (the highest Swiss court) has 
developed a rather substantial jurisprudence on the relationship between international law 
and federal acts. According to this jurisprudence, an act may only prevail over international 
law if it was passed after the respective international norm had come into force and if it was 
Parliament’s intention to pass an act that violates international law;54 the ECHR is afforded 
a special status and prevails even over this type of federal acts.
55
 In contrast, as far as the 
relationship between international law and the Federal Constitution is concerned, the 
Federal Court has so far merely touched upon the respective legal issues, without addressing 




In legal doctrine, views on how the conflict is to be solved are divided. A first group of 
scholars argues that international law should prevail over conflicting norms of the Federal 
Constitution. They base their argument mainly on Article 190 of the Federal Constitution, 
which requires courts to apply international law but fails to mention constitutional law. 
Based on a literal interpretation of this provision they conclude that, in case of a conflict, 
courts are bound to apply international law and, thus, prevented from applying the 
conflicting constitutional norm.
57
 The view that international law should take precedence is 
especially compelling as far as the ECHR is concerned. The ECHR is distinct from other 
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international instruments in that, with the European Court of Human Rights, it has an 
authoritative and respected judicial control mechanism. Since a finding of a violation of the 
ECHR by the European Court constitutes a ground to revise the preceding decision of the 
Federal Court,
58
 the latter arguably has a duty to prevent findings of violations by the 
Strasbourg Court. It was for this reason that, as explained above, the Federal Court decided 
to give priority to the ECHR over any type of federal acts. It would only be consistent to 
extend this practice to constitutional norms.
59
 However, in view of the unclear legal 
situation, it is doubtful whether the courts would in fact be willing not to give effect to a 
constitutional norm, given the strong democratic legitimacy such norms enjoy. 
 
A second group of scholars – probably the majority – holds that newer constitutional law 
should prevail over conflicting international law. They argue that the Federal Constitution 
refers to peremptory norms of international law as the sole limitation on popular initiatives, 
thus allowing popular votes on proposals that violate other norms of international law. It 
would, they suggest, make a mockery of the democratic process if a constitutional norm 
approved by the people was not implemented because courts are prevented from applying 
it.
60
 According to some authors, a constitutional norm should, at the very least, then prevail 
over international law if, as is the case with federal acts, it was the intention of the body 
passing it to violate international law.
61
 This position, however, raises the complex question 
as to how to establish what the intention of voters approving the respective constitutional 
norm was. 
 
The Federal Council has sided with this second group of scholars. In a report on the 
relationship between international and domestic law of 2010, it states that a directly 
applicable and newer constitutional norm, such as the minarets ban, should prevail over 
older international law.
62
 Where a popular initiative was clearly intended to violate 
international law, its approval by voters and cantons must, according to the Federal Council, 
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be interpreted as a mandate to withdraw from the respective international obligations.
63
 
Again, this raises the difficult problem of establishing voters’ intentions. For instance, in the 
case of the minarets ban, the federal authorities had recommended voters reject the initiative 
because it violated human rights, in particular the freedom of religion.
64
 Most proponents, 
however, had argued that the ban would not amount to an interference with this freedom as 
the construction of minarets was not covered by it.
65
 Therefore, it would be difficult to argue 
that the majority of voters intended, or even only accepted, a violation of the ECHR. 
Moreover, as the Federal Council also acknowledges, with regard to certain international 
treaties, including the ECHR, political reasons make withdrawal an unrealistic option.
66
 
With other treaties, withdrawal may even be legally impossible. The ICCPR, for example, 
does not contain a denunciation clause, and the UN Human Rights Committee has explicitly 




Accordingly, there is now broad consensus that there is a need for constitutional reform to 
prevent these kinds of conflict between popular initiatives and human rights from arising in 




4 Proposals for reforming the current system 
The conflict between recent popular initiatives and human rights guarantees has not only led 
to a major debate in Swiss legal scholarship but has also triggered different political 
initiatives, including even the foundation of a new umbrella organisation that ‘aims to 
strengthen the interaction between human rights and direct democracy’.68 Legal scholars, 
members of Parliament, and various organisations have put forth numerous proposals for 
reform. Perhaps most significantly, in March 2011 the Federal Council, upon request by 
Parliament, published a follow-up report to its 2010 report on the relationship between 
international and domestic law, setting out several specific suggestions for amending the 
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legal framework for popular initiatives.
69
 Given space constraints, this Section provides 
merely an overview of the most important and most concrete reform proposals put forward 
so far. 
 
One set of proposed changes relates to the preliminary review of popular initiatives prior to 
the start of the collection of signatures, which is currently restricted to a purely formal 
review of the signature sheets by the Federal Chancellery. It has been suggested that 
initiatives should be reviewed also for their compliance with the four substantive 
requirements outlined in the previous Section – and possibly further requirements such as 
compliance with the ECHR – at this earlier point in time, as there is then significantly less 
political pressure not to invalidate an initiative than once 100,000 persons have expressed 
their support.
70
 As a further change, a member of Parliament proposed that this earlier 
review of the validity of popular initiatives should be undertaken by a judicial body to 
ensure it is based on legal rather than political considerations.
71
 However, in April 2011 
Parliament voted against this proposed extension of the preliminary review.
72
 A more 
modest amendment has been suggested by the Federal Council in its follow-up report. 
According to the Federal Council, the preliminary review should be extended to include an 
assessment, carried out by a department of the government, of the conformity of popular 
initiatives with international law. However, this assessment would not be binding, meaning 
that the initiative would not have to be withdrawn or amended if it is found to violate 
international law and that the Federal Assembly would still be free to come to a different 
conclusion in its decision on the validity of the initiative. The purpose of this preliminary 
assessment would merely be to inform the authors of the initiative about possible conflicts 
with international law and thus enable them to amend its text. In addition, a ‘warning sign’ 
would be added to the signature sheets, informing potential signatories as to whether the 
initiative violates ius cogens or other norms of international law.
73
 This, the Federal Council 
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A second set of reform proposals relates to the review of popular initiatives by the Federal 
Assembly after submission of the required number of signatures. Some legal scholars as 
well as a number of parliamentarians advocate procedural changes to address the problem 
that under current law the decision on the validity of popular initiatives – a decision that 
should be based on legal considerations – is the exclusive domain of Parliament, a political 
body. They suggest that this competence should be transferred to the Federal Court
75
 or 
some newly created judicial body;
76
 or that it should be possible to bring a legal challenge 
against the Federal Assembly’s decision;77 or, at the very least, that the Federal Assembly 
should be able to request a legal opinion from the Federal Court.
78
 Others have proposed an 
extension of the substantive requirements popular initiatives must meet. Thus, an initiative 
could not only be declared invalid if it violates peremptory norms of international law but 
also if it conflicts with ‘norms of international law that are of vital importance to 
Switzerland’,79 international human rights guarantees (in particular those contained in the 
ECHR),
80
 ‘rights forming part of the European public order’,81 or a number of international 
norms that would be explicitly listed.
82
 Also in this regard the Federal Council, while taking 
up some of these ideas, has formulated a much more modest proposal for reform. It suggests 
adding a new validity requirement according to which popular initiatives must respect ‘the 
core (Kerngehalt) of fundamental rights’, a term of art of Swiss constitutional law that 
describes those aspects of fundamental rights that enjoy absolute protection and can thus 
never be restricted.
83
 Thus, an initiative could be declared invalid if it violates the 
prohibition of the death penalty (belonging to the core of the right to life), the right not to be 
forced to perform a religious act (belonging to the core of the freedom of religion), or the 
prohibition of forced marriage (belonging to the core of the right to marriage).  
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A third set of proposals is primarily aimed at increasing the transparency of the political 
debate leading up to popular votes on problematic initiatives and providing clearer 
guidelines for the implementation of such initiatives by Parliament. Thus, it has been 
suggested that if the Federal Assembly comes to the conclusion that it would be impossible 
to implement an initiative in its original form in a way that is compatible with international 
law, it should issue an opinion to that effect, together with a recommendation to voters to 
reject the initiative. If the initiative nonetheless gains a majority in the popular vote, the 
Federal Assembly would have to draft a constitutional norm that comes as closely as 
possible to the original text of the initiative but is still compatible with international law. 




Finally, a number of proposals would address the problem at the last possible stage, once a 
popular initiative has been approved and the respective constitutional amendment has 
entered into force. They would do so by addressing the current lack of explicit rules 
instructing courts as to how they should solve the conflict between the new constitutional 
norm and international law. Thus, one possibility would be to add a provision to the Federal 
Constitution that essentially codifies the rules developed by the Federal Court for the 
relationship between international law and federal acts, extending them to constitutional 
norms. Accordingly, a (newer) constitutional norm would prevail over (older) international 
law provided that, first, voters and the cantons approved it knowing that it violates a norm 
of international law and, second, that norm of international law is not a guarantee of the 
ECHR.
85
 However, the Federal Council rejected this proposal in its follow-up report, 
arguing that it would often be difficult to establish whether there was an intention to deviate 
from international law and that, instead of having a strict regulation as to which type of 
norm prevails, it is preferable to leave it to the courts to weigh the different interests at stake 
in a given case.
86
 Another option would be to introduce a provision into the Federal 
Constitution which states that, in case of a conflict, constitutional guarantees of fundamental 
rights prevail over any other norms, whether other constitutional norms or norms contained 
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in a federal act.
87
 Such a provision would create a hierarchy within the constitution. As a 
consequence, for example, a court would be prevented from applying Article 72(3) of the 
Federal Constitution (the minarets ban) to the extent that it is incompatible with Article 15 
(the freedom of religion), despite the fact that the former is the more recent and more 
specific norm. Since essentially all ECHR and ICCPR guarantees are covered by the 
fundamental rights catalogue of the Federal Constitution, such a solution would ensure that 
courts, at least indirectly, would also give effect to the most important international human 
rights guarantees in all cases.  
 
 
5 Assessment of reform proposals 
Given the Swiss system of ‘consensus democracy’, which tends to produce outcomes that 
strike a balance between differing political positions,
88
 the prospects for the more radical 
proposals for reform are rather bleak. If any reforms will be realised in the – perhaps not so 
near – future (the mills of Swiss democracy grind slowly),89 it seems most likely that they 
will be largely along the lines of the very limited changes suggested by the Federal Council. 
This would be an unsatisfactory result, since, as the Federal Council admits itself, these 
changes will not provide a solution to all the problems arising from popular initiatives that 
violate human rights.
90
 In fact, it will be argued here, they would hardly make any 
difference at all to the present situation. 
 
The Federal Council’s suggestion to extend the preliminary review of popular initiatives to 
include an assessment of their conformity with international law and to add a respective 
‘warning sign’ on signature sheets is to be welcomed. It is important that citizens are able to 
make an informed decision as to whether or not to sign and, later, vote for or against a 
popular initiative. In that sense, this new requirement would fulfil a similar role to that 
served by statements of compatibility according to section 19 of the British Human Rights 
Act: to inform the voting body about potential conflicts with international law (or, in the 
case of the United Kingdom, the ECHR), which the proposed measure may entail. However, 
the Federal Council’s claim that this extended preliminary review would contribute to a 
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reduction of the number of popular initiatives that violate international law seems overly 
optimistic.
91
 Recent empirical evidence suggests that the vast majority of Swiss citizens do 
not care much about the legal implications of the popular initiatives they vote on.
92
 In fact, 
one may wonder if the ‘warning sign’ on signature sheets may not turn out to be 
counterproductive. In the current political climate where everything coming from outside 
the Swiss borders is looked upon with much distrust, the popularity of a proposal may 
actually increase if the tag ‘Attention, violates international law!’ is attached to it. This will 
be all the more so if it is the government, rather than some independent body, which 
attaches that tag. 
 
As far as the validity review of popular initiatives by the Federal Assembly is concerned, 
the procedural changes that have been suggested seem the most promising ones in terms of 
effectiveness. Since Parliament as a political body will inevitably be reluctant to declare an 
initiative invalid once 100,000 signatures have been collected, involvement of a judicial 
body in this decision would undoubtedly contribute to a more stringent review of initiatives. 
However, political support for such a change is minimal
93
 and the Federal Council did not 
even address the possibility of such a reform in its follow-up report. As to the creation of 
new substantive requirements that popular initiatives would have to meet, most of the 
proposed requirements (such as conformity with ‘norms of international law that are of vital 
importance to Switzerland’) seem too vague to be readily applicable in practice. The 
requirement suggested by the Federal Council, respect of ‘the core of fundamental rights’, in 
turn, is far too limited to have any significant effect. Not a single one of the recent 
problematic initiatives that gave rise to the current debate would have failed to meet this 
modest threshold. In fact, it is difficult to think of any measure with realistic prospects of 
being proposed in the near future that would violate ‘the core of a fundamental right’.94  
 
In any event, the creation of new substantive hurdles for popular initiatives is not, it is 
submitted, an appropriate means to prevent conflicts with human rights guarantees. The 
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right to launch a popular initiative is a political right of central importance in the Swiss 
system of (semi-)direct democracy. Any restrictions imposed should be kept to a minimum. 
Within certain, very narrowly defined limits, citizens should be able to propose what they 
want, even if the proposal is radical or only intended to ‘send a signal’ – just as, in a 
representative democracy, there are generally no limits on what can be voted on in 
parliament.
95
 The extent to which a proposed measure is compatible with already existing 
norms and can thus be implemented is, however, a different issue. Whether a constitutional 
amendment entails a violation of human rights can be better assessed ex post, by reviewing 
individual cases in which the respective measure is applied, rather than through an ex ante 
review of an abstract proposal. Especially with proposals that are more complex than, for 
example, the minarets ban – and most measures proposed by way of popular initiatives are 
more complex – it may be very difficult to predict whether or not they will lead to a conflict 
with human rights guarantees. Making the difficult distinction between a permissible 
interference with, and an impermissible violation of, human rights is a determination that 




It is thus at the final stage, the stage where a new constitutional norm is applied and the 
respective measures are challenged before the courts, that the tension between direct 
democracy and human rights should be addressed primarily. It is all the more unfortunate 
that the Federal Council has not formulated any proposals for reform in this regard. As 
explained above, under current law, the courts would have to give precedence to a new 
constitutional norm over older constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights, while it is 
unclear how they should deal with a conflict between a new constitutional norm and older 
international law, including international guarantees of human rights. 
 
The suggestion to create a new rule according to which, in case of a conflict, guarantees of 
fundamental rights prevail over any other norms is a sensible way forward. (Although it 
must be acknowledged that, at a theoretical level, it may not be easy to come up with a 
coherent justification for giving fundamental rights priority over other constitutional 
norms.)
97
 It would then be for courts to decide whether a given measure based on the new 
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constitutional norm amounts to an interference with fundamental rights and, if so, whether it 
is permissible because it pursues a legitimate aim in a proportionate manner. To make these 
kinds of decisions is the proper domain of the courts, and they have a rich experience in 
doing so. Given the lack of safeguards protecting the interests of minorities in direct 
democratic decision-making pointed out above, it can even be argued that the justification 
for judicial review to ensure conformity with human rights is stronger in the case of 




As a consequence, measures that are not supported by a weighty public interest (for 
example, because their aim is merely symbolic) or impose a disproportionate burden on 
individuals (for example, because they amount to a serious interference with a fundamental 
freedom such as freedom of religion) would be invalidated at the level of application. The 
disadvantage of this would be that there will be popular votes on proposals that may then 
not be (fully) implemented. However, this is not a serious problem. If voters know that 
human rights guarantees will take precedence once it comes to implementation of a proposal 
and a potential lack of conformity with such guarantees is highlighted before the vote (for 
example, by way of the suggested preliminary review and respective ‘warning signs’), it can 
hardly be claimed that voters are misled and the democratic process undermined.
99
 In fact, it 
is likely that public debates leading up to popular votes would benefit by becoming more 
focused on the questions of the legitimate aim and the proportionality of a proposed 
measure than is currently the case, which would be a welcome development improving the 
understanding of human rights within the general public. 
 
Under current law, courts do not have the power to review federal acts for their 
constitutionality.
100
 As it would be illogical to authorise courts to review constitutional, but 
not statutory, norms for their conformity with fundamental rights, it makes good sense that 
according to the proposed change also federal acts could be reviewed. However, this 
creation of a form of constitutional review at the federal level, although limited to a review 
for conformity with fundamental rights, would be likely to be viewed by many as amounting 
to a radical change of the Swiss constitutional landscape – notwithstanding that, as 
explained above, the Federal Court already now gives precedence to ECHR guarantees over 
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federal acts. It is doubtful that there is sufficient political support for such a change. At the 
time of writing, the Federal Assembly is debating several proposals for the introduction of a 
form of constitutional review at the federal level, although not in direct relation to the issues 
discussed in this article or in the exact form presented above.
101
 According to press reports, 






In Switzerland, the relationship between direct democracy and human rights has 
traditionally been idealised as one of congruence and mutual reinforcement. The great 
constitutional lawyer Zaccaria Giacometti, for example, writing more than 50 years ago, 
argued that it is an empirical fact that Swiss democracy functions as ‘the guardian of human 
rights’: at least if it is ‘mature’ enough for democracy, he was convinced, the people will 
always decide in favour of human rights.
103
 However, it has become increasingly clear in 
recent years that there may be a real tension between direct democracy and human rights, 
especially in a political climate where direct democratic proposals targeting unpopular 
minorities may serve as powerful instruments of political public relations. Direct democracy 
may be a good thing for those minorities that have a certain degree of political leverage, 
allowing them to make effective use of direct democratic instruments themselves, and that 
are perceived as well-integrated into society, but it tends to have a negative impact on those 
groups that are regarded as alien, as not being a proper part of society. This is not to say that 
representative democracies are completely immune from this problem. A recent example 
illustrating that they are not is the UK Parliament’s decision of February 2011 to uphold the 
blanket ban preventing prisoners from voting,
104
 which is in clear contravention of Article 3 
of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR,
105
 on the basis that prisoners, by committing a crime, have 
‘set themselves apart from society’.106 It is an interesting parallel to the vote on the minarets 
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ban in Switzerland that MPs voting in favour of the ban intended to thereby ‘send a signal’ 




The legal framework currently in place in Switzerland does not provide sufficient protection 
against popular initiatives that violate human rights – or, at least, it does not state clearly 
enough that it would do so. The Federal Constitution should be amended to make it explicit 
that, when it comes to the implementation of a constitutional norm approved in a popular 
vote, courts are not bound to apply that norm if, in the case at hand, this would lead to a 
violation of fundamental rights. This can hardly be characterised as a serious limitation on 
direct democracy. On the contrary: human rights are the lifeblood of democracy and their 




In any event, the popular sovereign would not necessarily be prevented from restricting 
human rights if it really wanted to. However, instead of by singling out unpopular 
minorities, it would have to do so in a consistent manner – namely, by amending the 
fundamental rights catalogue of the Federal Constitution and, possibly, instructing the 
government to withdraw from relevant international human rights treaties. For example, if 
the majority of voters does not want to fully protect the freedom to manifest one’s religion, 
the scope of the respective constitutional guarantee should be redefined accordingly (for 
example, by making it clear that the construction of religious buildings is not covered by it) 
and Switzerland should withdraw, where this is possible, from treaties guaranteeing the 
freedom of religion. Similarly, if the UK Parliament does not want the right to vote to apply 
to everyone, it is free to decide that Protocol No 1 to the ECHR should be denounced. Given 
the far-reaching consequences of this alternative (such as reduced human rights protection 
also for those in the majority and isolation from the international and European 
communities), one can be reasonably confident that it will appear too unattractive to gather 
much support. This is all the more true considering that votes such as that on the minarets 
ban or that on the voting ban for prisoners are often used merely as an opportunity to take a 
symbolic stand. There can be no harm, then, in courts refusing to give effect to such 
symbolic measures as far as they conflict with human rights. 
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